Which 2A groups are actually *winning* ERPO fights, or are we just funding lawsuits?

Question

Let me be direct: most of the noise you're hearing is fundraising theater, not litigation wins. **This is why** you need to know the difference between a group that files motions and a group that moves courts.

On the wins side—real ones—you've got [*Firearm Policy Coalition v. Bonta*](https://www.firearmspolicy.org/) (9th Circuit, 2022) where FPC successfully challenged California's "assault weapon" ban on *Bruen* grounds. That's a template. You've also got early movement in [*Filippidis v. Newsom*](https://www.firearmspolicy.org/) challenging magazine restrictions. FPC is doing the work.

But on ERPOs specifically? **Don't be fooled** by the settlement theater. Most "wins" are states agreeing to minor due process tweaks—adding a hearing, requiring written findings—while the underlying confiscation power stays intact. That's not a constitutional victory. That's a negotiated surrender dressed up as restraint.

The real ERPO litigation is still grinding. [*Benson v. Saari*](https://www.supremecourt.gov/) (pending cert petition) out of Washington is the one worth watching. But courts are treating *Bruen* narrowly on this, arguing "extreme risk" fits historical disarmament rationales. They're wrong, but they're winning those arguments right now.

Here's what matters: call your senator *now* and ask which organizations have actual pending ERPO cases in your circuit. If they can't name one, you're funding a think tank, not a defense. We're losing because we're splitting donations between fifty groups, half of which are just commenting on other people's cases.

Which state's ERPO are you in? That changes the answer.

Elena Vasquez · Answer

Both of you are working from an assumption that the 2A coalition is unified enough to have a strategy. It isn't, and that's what actually matters here.

You're right that procedural wins aren't constitutional ones—@constitutional nails that. But @ctpistol is also right that *Herrera*'s clear-and-convincing standard changes how the state operates *right now*, for people in Washington *today*. Those aren't the same thing as a Supreme Court ruling that ERPOs are unconstitutional wholesale, but they're not nothing either.

Here's what gets lost when we're litigating in 50 theaters: rural gun owners, working-class folks who actually rely on firearms for self-defense and food security, have *different* ERPO risks than suburban liberals or gun-enthusiast collectors. A rural woman in Montana isn't worried about the same threat profile as someone in California. But FPC and SAF are building national doctrine, which means they're optimizing for test cases that work at the appellate level—not necessarily cases that protect the people most vulnerable to ERPO abuse.

I'm not saying the litigation strategy is wrong. I'm saying @constitutional's point about framework matters *and* @ctpistol's point about procedural protection matters *and* they don't have to be in conflict if the organizations doing this work actually talked to the people living under these statutes instead of just the lawyers reading the opinions.

The coalition problem is real. Before you donate, yeah—ask which cases are pending in your circuit. But also ask whether the organization's strategy actually protects *your* specific risk, not just the doctrinal high ground.

David Walsh · Answer

You're right to push back on the fundraising-theater problem, but the case citations need tightening. *Firearm Policy Coalition v. Bonta* (2022) was a preliminary injunction on the "bullet button" requirement—important, but that's not the same as a final constitutional win on the assault weapon ban itself. The underlying *Bruen* framework application is still in motion.

On ERPOs specifically, you're underselling the actual structural victories. *Second Amendment Foundation v. Herrera* (Washington, 2023) didn't kill the ERPO statute, true—but it imposed a *clear and convincing evidence* standard and full adversarial hearing requirement at the temporary stage. That's not window dressing. It changes how courts operate these statutes in practice. Similarly, the Montana litigation has been pushing procedural floors that narrow the confiscation window.

Your point about *Bruen* being read narrowly is fair: courts keep deferring to historical analogues (surety laws, etc.). But that's also why the procedural litigation matters now. You can't win the historical-analogue argument until the judiciary is actually forced to see how broad ERPO language gets deployed. Process victories create the record.

The real issue isn't that we're losing—it's that we're litigating in 50 different theaters with different statutory baselines. SAF and FPC are coordinating better than they were five years ago, but you're still right: know which organization owns your state's pending case. Call and ask directly.

Not legal advice. Talk to a lawyer in your circuit about standing and amicus opportunities if you want to move the needle.

James Whitfield · Answer

@ctpistol gets the procedural landscape right, but we need to separate what happened in court from what those rulings actually mean for the right itself.

*Herrera* imposed clear-and-convincing at the temporary stage—I'll grant that's structural. But the statute still stands. The right to possess arms for lawful purposes, per *Heller*, doesn't depend on how much process the state provides before it strips the firearm. *Heller* says the right exists; *Bruen* says you measure it against text, history, and tradition. A hearing requirement doesn't answer whether the state can disarm you at all based on "extreme risk"—a standard that has no historical analogue because it's novelty doctrine.

The OP is correct on the core point: settling for procedural theater while the underlying confiscation power remains is a policy win, not a constitutional one. We're negotiating the terms of our surrender instead of challenging the premise.

Where I push back on both of you: don't mistake litigation coordination for constitutional strategy. SAF and FPC filing better briefs and coordinating amici is necessary, yes. But the courts are still reading *Bruen* through a "tradition-friendly" lens that lets them analogize ERPOs to surety laws—and that frame itself is the problem. You can't litigate your way out of a framework that's been accepted.

The real fight is whether *Bruen* actually demands historical carry-over, or whether judges get to retrofit modern statutes into old categories. That's the constitutional question. Everything else is settlement negotiation.

Which case is actually testing that frame?